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STUDENT ARTICLES
A Discussion of the Deregulation of the
Energy Industry in Illinois and its Effects
on Consumers
By Brian DeVirgilio*
I. The Deregulation Movement
Deregulation in the utility market began in 1996 in an effort
to increase competition and lower energy prices to consumers. How-
ever, more than a decade after the federal government attempted to
create competition in the electricity generation industry the market
has not produced the desired rate decreases.' Still, certain states, in-
cluding Illinois, have experienced rate decreases during the past ten
years of deregulation. These decreases were due to rate caps or
freezes by state agencies that have largely remained in control of
electricity rates. Consequently, a genuine competitive market for the
generation of electricity failed to emerge from deregulation. 2 Instead,
many states have either suspended or delayed establishing a competi-
tive system while others have attempted to either purchase investor-
owned utilities or replace utilities with municipal power.
3
Prior to 1996, regulated utilities owned and operated power
plants and were in the business of both generating and distributing
* J.D. candidate, May 2008, Loyola University Chicago School of Law;
B.B.A. in Accounting, University of Notre Dame, 2002. The author would like to
thank his loving wife Laura, his family and friends, as well as the students and fac-
ulty at Loyola University Chicago for all of their support and encouragement.
'David Cay Johnston, Competitive Era Fails to Shrink Electric Bills, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 15, 2006, Section 1.
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electricity to their customers.4 Currently, a decade after the deregula-
tion movement began, in many states, including Illinois, regulated
utilities no longer generate their own electricity, but purchase power
from electricity generating companies. 5 The regulated utilities then
deliver the electricity to their customers for a delivery charge, which
in Illinois, is set by the Illinois Commerce Commission ("ICC"). 6
The price of electricity was to be set by market forces that resulted
from competition to supply energy distributors with electricity.7
However, in most states the number of power producers is relatively
small, and a genuine market has not developed for the wholesale
price of electricity.
8
The fact that energy prices have increased in many states de-
spite deregulation has caused many to look into the system to identify
potential problems. One identified problem is that utilities delivering
electricity have been purchasing electricity from generating compa-
nies that are related entities at prices far from the lowest available. 9
As a result, the related entity has a ready market for the electricity
that it generates, while the utility passes along the additional cost of
purchasing energy to its customers. The related entity then reports
inflated profits earned by the sale of its generated electricity, and the
utility reports inflated revenues earned through the distribution of the
higher priced electricity. A second problem has recently been dis-
covered by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which has
concluded that companies producing electricity have been limiting
the supply in order to drive energy prices up during peak energy use
times. Finally, over the past decade several states, including Cali-
fornia, New Jersey and most recently Illinois, have resorted to power
4id.
' Id. See also Robert Manor, Auction Hints of Energy Hikes Illinois Monitors
Jersey Power Sale, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 11, 2006; Jeffrey Tomich, Illinois Lawmaker
Seeks Electric Rate Freeze, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 21, 2006, at C 10.
6 The ICC was established by the Illinois Public Utility Act. See 220 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/2-101 (2007). The ICC is given the authority to establish or alter
rates or charges related to public utilities so long as the rates are just and reason-
able. See 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-201(b)-(c) (2007). The information require-
ments for filing an increase in rates for electric utilities with the ICC are set out at
ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 83, §285.310 (2007). See also Johnston, supra note 1.
7 See Johnston, supra note 1.
8 1d.
9Id.
1 0 Id.
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auctions in order to procure electricity to be delivered to consumers.''
Recently, the energy auction process has been questioned as to
whether it results in energy prices that are truly determined by the
open market.'
2
The purpose of this article is to discuss energy deregulation in
Illinois and the results of the recent power auction. This article will
then discuss the effect of the power auction on consumers in 2007
and subsequent years. A variety of options are presented, some from
the utilities themselves and others from the Illinois General Assem-
bly, as alternatives for consumers who are overly burdened by the re-
sults of the power auction. Next, this article will look at the financial
condition of Illinois' largest energy providers; Commonwealth Edi-
son ("ComEd") and AmerenCIPS, AmerenCILCO, and AmerenIP
(collectively "Ameren"). Finally, demand pricing will be discussed
as a potential way for consumers to keep energy costs low in the fu-
ture.
II. Deregulation in Illinois - the Transition Period
Illinois was a part of the deregulation movement beginning in
1997 when the Illinois General Assembly passed the Electric Service
Customer Choice and Rate Relief Law. IV This law created the oppor-
tunity for Illinois residents and businesses to choose their power sup-
plier. 14 The law also restructured Illinois' electric power industry. 15
During that time most of the utilities either spun-off their generating
business or sold their power plants and entered into long-term supply
contracts. 16 As a result, companies in Illinois, such as CornEd and
Ameren, no longer generated any power, but rather purchased power
on the wholesale market to deliver to their customers.' 7 The overall
result was that Illinois electricity rates were cut by approximately 20
" See Manor, supra note 5; Johnston, supra note 1.
12 Johnston, supra note 1.In California, the 2000 auction was manipulated such
that prices were in excess of what the un-manipulated market would have war-
ranted.
13 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-101 - 5/16-130 (2007).
14 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-119 (2007).
15 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-101 - 5/16-130 (2007).
16 Illinois Commerce Commission, Post 2006 Initiative: Final Staff Report to
the Commission, at 1 (Dec. 2, 2004) available at http://www.icc.illinois.gov/docs/
en/041203ecPostRptFinal.pdf [hereinafter ICC Staff Report].
17 See Manor, supra note 5; Tomich, supra note 5.
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percent and frozen in an effort to encourage competition.1 8
The hope was that during the ten-year rate freeze, which con-
cluded on January 1, 2007, competition would result in an increase in
options for Illinois energy customers.19 Therefore, the rate freeze pe-
riod was meant to act as a transition period from a completely regu-
lated industry to a market-based industry. 20 However, increased
competition did not result and most of the state's electricity continued
to be generated and delivered by the same players, ComEd, Ameren,
and related entities of the two.21 Despite the efforts of the state legis-
lature, Illinois still has only two major electric utility companies that
service Illinois residences and businesses: Ameren, which serves ap-
proximately 1.2 million customers in central and southern Illinois,
and ComEd which serves 3.7 million customers across northern Illi-
nois. 22 Because the transition period did not produce the desired re-
suits, the ICC was left with trying to determine how to price electric-
ity and how Illinois utilities would procure energy to distribute after
the transition period ended.23
In an effort to determine possible solutions to the questions
raised during the transition Period, ICC staff issued a report to the
ICC on December 2, 2004. The report included recommendations
as to how electricity delivered by the Illinois utilities should be
priced, as well as how the utilities should procure the energy they dis-
tribute after the end of the transition period. 25 The ICC staff recom-
mended a vertical tranche auction for utilities like Ameren and Co-
mEd; large utilities that lacked the capacity to generate their own
18 Manor, supra note 5; Ryan Keith, Illinoisans Brace for Electric Rate In-
crease in 2007, AP ALERT - POL., Dec. 31, 2006, at 1.
'9 See Keith, supra note 18, at 1.
20 ICC Staff Report, supra note 16, at 1.
21 Id.
22 Kevin McDermott, Utilities Run Ads Backing Rate Hike, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Nov. 26, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 20467830 (stating that Illi-
nois' two major electricity suppliers are Ameren and ComEd.). See also The num-
ber of ComEd's customers by region, http://www.exeloncorp.com/ ourcompa-
nies/comed (last visited Mar. 5, 2007); Ameren's Corporate Fact Sheet,
http://www.ameren.com/AboutUs/ADCAUFactSheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 5,
2007)(indicating that AmerenCILCO has 215,000 electric customers, AmerenCIPS
has 400,000 electric customers, and AmerenIP has 625,000 electric customers).
23 See ICC Staff Report, supra note 16.
24 Id. at 1.
25 Id. at 1-2.
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power.26 Under a vertical tranche auction, Illinois utilities would di-
vide their load obligation, or energy requirements, for the year verti-
27cally into tranches, or slices, of energy. For example, ComEd di-
vided their load requirements into six categories where each category
included customers with different characteristics and load, or usage,
28requirements. The winning supplier and prices are then determined
via an auction process. 29 Essentially, energy generators bid to supply
the Illinois utilities with electricity at set prices, and the _rocess con-
tinues until each utility's power need has been satisfied. U The prod-
ucts auctioned are the rights to supply utilities with their energy re-
quirements for the year.
3
III. Illinois Power Auction
On February 25, 2005, CornEd filed a proposal with the ICC
calling for a competitive energy procurement process. 32 ComEd's
goal was to determine a procurement process that would accurately
determine the market price of electricity to enable CoinEd to provide
electricity to its customers beginning on January 2, 2007 at just and
reasonable rates.33 ConEd advocated the use of annual energy auc-
tions as a viable competitive procurement process.34 On February 28,
2005, Ameren filed its proposal with the ICC in which it outlined an
auction process to determine prices that would be passed on to cus-
tomers after the conclusion of the transition period.P5 While the ICC
26Id. at 10.
27 See Id. at 11.
28 See Illinois Auction, Rate Information, http://www.illinois-auction.com/ in-
dex. cfm?fa=gen.rate (last visited Feb. 5, 2007).
29 ICC Staff Report, supra note 16, at 11; See Illinois Auction, Auction Format,
http://www.illinois-auction.com/index.cfm?fa=gen.for (last visited Feb. 5, 2007)
[hereinafter Illinois Auction].
30 Keith, supra note 18, at 1.
31 See Illinois Auction, supra note 29.
32 See Suspended Tariff Cover Letter for ComEd (Feb. 25, 2005), available at
http://www.icc.illinois.gov/e-Docket/ docket number 05-159 (last visited Mar. 5,
2007).
33 Id.
34 See Suspended Tariff Pages - Rider CPP for CornEd (Feb. 25, 2005), avail-
able at http://www.icc.illinois.gov/e-Docket/ docket number 05-159.
35 See Suspended Supplemental Information for Ameren (Feb. 28, 2005),
available at http://www.icc.illinois.gov/e-Docket/ docket number 05-160.
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was considering the proposals, the Office of the Illinois Attorney
General filed a lawsuit against the ICC on September 1, 2005 to pre-
vent the ICC from approving a power auction.36 However, despite
the efforts of the Illinois Attorney General, on January 24, 2006, the
ICC approved the use of a vertical tranche auction as a competitive
procurement method.37
After the ICC approved the use of an auction, many lawmak-
ers advocated an extension of the electricity rate freeze through the
year 2010. 38 Chief among the supporters of a rate freeze extension
was the Speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives, Michael
Madigan. 3p Despite the efforts of the legislature to extend the rate
freeze, the power auction took place beginning on September 5, 2006
and ending on September 8, 2006.40
The vertical tranche auction process adopted by Illinois was
closely based on the annual auction method employed by New Jer-
sey.41 The Illinois power auction can be described as a descending
clock auction where all the products, rights to supply either Ameren
or ComEd with energy, are up for auction simultaneously.42 Energy
generators registered as bidders were then able to bid on the products
in the auction.43 At the beginning of each round of the auction, the
Auction Manager announces a price for the products offered.44 Prior
to the beginning of the auction, the Auction Manager, in consultation
with the utilities and ICC staff, determine the original maximum
price offered.45 Bidders then determine the number of tranches that
36 Press Release, Illinois Attorney General (Sept. 1, 2005),
http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2005_09/20050901 c.html
31 See Order - Final for Ameren,, at 105-06, (Jan. 24, 2006), available at
http://www.icc.illinois.gov/e-Docket/ docket number 05-160.
38 Tomich, supra note 5.
39 See Id.; John Chase & Rick Pearson, House OKs Rate Freeze, but Chances
Dim in Senate, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 8, 2007, at 1.
40 Exelon, Ameren Units Lead in Illinois Auction, ENERGY TRADER, Dec. 7,
2006, at 13 [hereinafter Energy Trader Article].
41 Manor, supra note 5.
42 See Illinois Auction, supra note 29.
41 See Id.
44 See Id.
15 See Illinois Auction Rules, at 27 (May 15, 2006), available at
http://www.illinois-auction.com/resources/auction/IllinoisAuctionRules5-
15.pdf. [hereinafter Auction Rules]
2007]
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they will be able to provide at the set prices. 46 If excess tranches are
bid during a round, meaning that the supply exceeds the demand,
then the price for that product is reduced in the next round of the auc-
tion. 47 The Auction Manager reduces the price based on a given per-
centage of the previous price and announces the new price for each
product in the next round.48 Prices start high in the auction and as the
supply bids exceed the demand, the price of electricity gradually de-
creases as the auction progresses. 49 The prices continue to drop until
the supply equals the demand. 50 The results of the auction produced
wholesale electricity prices of $64.77/mwh for a 17-month contract
for Ameren verses a wholesale price of $63.96/mwh for a 17-month
contract for ComEd. 51 The contracts that were awarded ranged from
17-month contracts to 41-month contracts with either Ameren or
CoinEd.52  The wholesale prices for the contracts ranged from
$63.33/mwh to $66.05/mwh.5
IV. Effect of the Illinois Power Auction on Consumers
A. Components of Consumer Utility Bills
The utility companies in Illinois do not make any money from
the electricity that they buy from generators and then distribute to
their customers. 54 The profits earned by utilities like CoinEd result
from a delivery fee which is independent from the cost of power.
55
The two main components of electricity bills are delivery costs and
generation costs. 56 The delivery portion of the bill accounts for ap-
46 See Illinois Auction, supra note 29.
41 See Id.
48 See Auction Rules, supra note 45.
49 See Illinois Auction, supra note 29.
50 id.
51 Energy Trader Article, supra note 40.
52 id.
53 Id.
54 Manor, supra note 5.
55 id.
56 Jerri Stroud, Ameren Gets OK for Rate Hike in Illinois, ST. LouIs POST-
DISPATCH, Nov. 23, 2006, at D1.
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proximately 20-30 percent of the total bill.57 The remainder of the
bill is generation costs from which the utilities do not profit, but sim-
ply pass on to customers in the price for energy. The delivery charge
is set by the ICC. Utilities may present a case to the ICC for certain
rate increases, at which time the ICC may either accept or deny any
aspect of the delivery rate increase. Therefore, Illinois residents will
be charged for any increases in the cost of energy resulting from the
auction, as well as any additional increases in delivery charges ap-
proved by the ICC.
B. Increased Energy Prices to Consumers
Immediately following the power auction, energy cost in-
creases estimated to take effect on January 2, 2007 were 22-26 per-
cent for CoinEd customers and 40-55 percent for Ameren custom-
ers. 58 Both increases were directly attributable to the higher than
expected cost of energy resulting from the power auction.59  In-
creased cost estimates leading up to the beginning of 2007 were even
more widespread. The Illinois utility estimates were lower than the
estimates produced by consumer advocates such as The Citizens Util-
ity Board ("CUB") and the Office of the Illinois Attorney General.
Ameren estimated that residential customers would face an increase
of close to 55 percent beginning in January 2007, while the Office of
the Illinois Attorney General estimated that increases could range
from 28 percent to as high as 99 percent for Ameren customers.6
0
For Ameren customers in the Metro East area as well as southern Illi-
nois, a substantial part of the increased rate was due to a 32 percent
increase in delivery charge approved by the ICC. 61 Despite the wide-
spread increased cost estimates leading up to the beginning of 2007,
the initial estimated ranges proved to be accurate.
62
57 d.
58 Rebecca Smith, Energy Auction in Illinois Will Lead to Jump in Rates for
Customers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2006, at A6.
59 id.
60 Adriana Colindres, ICC OKs Rate Phase-In Plan House Will Revisit Freeze
on Electricity Prices When Session Opens in January, ST. J.-REG. (Springfield, Ill.),
Dec. 21, 2006, at 13.
61 Stroud, supra note 56.
62 John Chase & Monique Garcia, Rate Hike Wary Get No Relief, CHI. TRJB.,
Jan. 10, 2007.
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C. Arguments For and Against the Power Auction
Opponents of the auction argued, and still argue, that the two
main utilities in Illinois, Ameren and CornEd, did not face sufficient
competition for the auction to be valid.63 After the release of the auc-
tion's actual results in the beginning of December 2006, many oppo-
nents of the auction found the results confirmed what they had feared
all along; that Exelon, the parent company of CoinEd, along with
only a few other major players in the energ 4 market, would be the
electricity generators with the winning bids. Sure enough, Exelon
Generation won over a quarter (27.1 percent) of the tranches awarded
at the auction while Ameren's wholesale unit was awarded 9 percent
of the total.65 With over one-third of the energy generated for the up-
coming year coming from parent companies or related entities of the
two main Illinois utility companies, consumer advocates did not think
the auction offered enough competition to ensure the price of electric-
ity was determined by a true competitive market.
66
One of the main arguments extolled by the opponents of the
power auction was that the Illinois Public Utilities Act did not allow
the charging of market-based rates to utility customers when custom-
ers did not have a viable alternative to their pre-existing utility com-
pany. 67 In other words, market-based rates should not be allowed in
Illinois because customers unhappy with Ameren or ComEd have no
other choice. 68 The purpose of deregulation was to allow entry for
new players in the energy market. However, since no new players
have emerged, the Office of the Illinois Attorney General argues the
existing players, Ameren and CoinEd, have no competition and thus
no incentive to keep prices low.
69
On the other hand, proponents of the power auction argue that
the format of the auction - prices ticking down in each round where
63 Ashley M. Heher, Illinois Electricity Rates to Climb as Much as 55 Percent,
AP ALERT, Sept. 15, 2006.
64 Energy Trader Article, supra note 40.
65 Id.
66 See id.
67 Press Release, Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan, Madigan, Devine,
Consumer Groups File Lawsuit Against Illinois Commerce Commission to Protect
CornEd and Ameren Customers (Sept. 1, 2005), available at
http://www.illinoisattomeygeneral.gov/pressroom/2005_09/20050901 c.html (last
visited Feb. 8, 2007).
68 Heher, supra note 63.
69 Id.
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supply was greater than demand - allowed for the lowest prices to be
offered to Illinois customers. 70 In fact, utility analysts immediately
following the power auction found that despite the significant price
increases in Illinois, electricity was still cheaper than that paid for on
the east or west coast.71 On September 14, 2006 the ICC approved
the results of the auction and declared the auction to be competitive.
72
D. Current Efforts to Curtail the Increased Costs to Consumers
After learning that overall electricity rate increases for Illinois
customers were estimated to be in the range of 22-55 percent for Co-
mEd and Ameren customers, the Illinois House of Representatives
considered freezing rates for three more years.73 In November 2006,
a bill which would have extended the rate freeze for an additional
three years was narrowly rejected.74 The Illinois utilities quickly shot
back by running television ads in November 2006 stating that if state
legislators froze electricity rates, as they had threatened to do, then
Illinois residents could suffer from rolling blackouts as California
residents have in the past.75 Ameren and CoinEd stated that if they
are required to deliver energy to customers at a fraction of the cost,
they will go bankrupt and citizens will have to rely on the state to
purchase power for its residents.76 Both utility companies claimed
they would lose millions of dollars a day if they were not allowed to
increase electricity rates beginning in 2007. 77 However, despite the
press scare tactics employed by the utility companies, the Illinois
House of Representatives was intent on pressing forward with its at-
tempts to freeze electricity rates.
By December 31, 2006, Illinois legislators could not agree on
the best way to curtail rate increases, so the higher rates took effect
beginning on January 2, 2007.78 ComEd customers in northern Illi-
70 id.
71 id.
72 Press Release, Illinois Commerce Commission, ICC Approves Results of
First Power Auction (Sept. 14, 2006), available at http://www.icc.illinois.gov/
docs/en/060914ecAuctionPR.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).
73 McDermott, supra note 22.
74 Colindres, supra note 60.
75 McDermott, supra note 22.
76 id.
77 Id.
78 Keith, supra note 18, at 1.
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nois experienced an average rate increase of 22 percent while
Ameren customers in central and southern Illinois experienced a rate
increase of 55 percent.79 Illinois House Speaker Michael Madigan
pledged to push for an extension of a rate freeze in early January of
2007.80
On January 7, 2007, the Illinois House approved a bill to ex-
tend the current freeze on electricity rates that would also roll-back
the rate increases threatening Illinois utility customers. 8' The bill
passed the House with 71 in favor and only 29 against the rate freeze
extension. 82 The bill then went before the Illinois Senate, which at
the time had its own relief plans for Illinois utility customers that did
not include an extension of the rate freeze. The Illinois Senate had
already approved a phase-in proposal backed by Senate President
83Emil Jones. Thus, the Illinois House and the Senate appeared to be
at a stalemate. As of the conclusion of the 9 4th Illinois General As-
sembly on January 9, 2007, the Illinois Senate had still not voted on
the three year extension to the electricity rate freeze backed by House
Speaker Michael Madigan, and in return Madigan never called a vote
on the Senate passed lan to phase-in rate increases backed by Senate
President Emil Jones. While the Illinois General Assembly squab-
bles over the best way to aid Illinois residents, nothing is being done
to help curtail the large increases in electricity rates currently affect-
ing consumers. As long as the stalemate lasts, Illinois residents will
be subjected to the increased rates.
Ironically, while the Illinois General Assembly argued about
how to aid consumers, Ameren and ComEd proposed phase-in plans
to the ICC.85 Ameren proposed that rate increases for residential cus-
tomers be phased-in over three years at the option of the individual
customer. 8' ComEd's proposal to the ICC also allowed customers to
phase-in the increased rates over three years. 87 The ICC has ap-
79 Id; Chase & Garcia, supra note 62.
80 Id.
8' Chase & Pearson, supra note 39.
82 id.
83 Keith, supra note 18, at 3.
84 Chase & Garcia, supra note 62.
85 See Keith, supra note 18, at 3.
86 Stroud, supra note 56.
87 Keith, supra note 18, at 3.
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proved both the Ameren and CornEd phase-in proposals. 88  The
Ameren phase-in, also known as the "Customer Elect Plan" will be
offered to residential customers, schools, some businesses and gov-
ernmental units.89 Under this plan, each customer will pay an extra
14 percent for three years with an additional 3.25 percent interest
charge on the amount they defer to later years. 90 Under the CornEd
phase-in, customers will pay an extra 10 percent each year for three
years and will also be charged an interest rate of 3.25 percent on all
payments deferred to later years. 9' Opponents of the phase-in argue
that current plans are more similar to a loan than a true phase-in due
to the interest charges that customers will incur in the long-run.
92
While it appears to be true that the Ameren and ComEd plans func-
tion more as loans rather than true rate phase-ins, at the very least,
Ameren and CoinEd have come up with plans to help consumers pay
for the increase in electricity rates in the short-run. The Illinois Gen-
eral Assembly, on the other hand, has refused to compromise in order
to help the people in the short-run or long-run. As the end of the first
quarter of 2007 approaches, the Illinois General Assembly still has
not taken any action.
V. Financial Condition of the Illinois Utility Companies
Amidst the call for an increase in electricity rates, CUB and
other consumer advocate groups argued that the utility companies
have been recording profits when rates were frozen so there is no vi-
able reason for the rate increases. 93 Since the year 2000, a seven-year
time period during which rates were frozen, CoinEd netted income of
$133 million in 2000, $607 million in 2001, $790 million in 2002,
$707 million in 2003, and $676 million in 2004.94 In 2005 and 2006,
88 Id. at 2.
89 Colindres, supra note 60; FAQs - Customer Elect Plan,
http://www.ameren.com/amerenpost2006/ADC_CEPFAQs.asp (last visited Mar.
5, 2007) [hereinafter Customer Elect FA Qs].
90 Keith, supra note 18, at 3; Customer Elect FAQs, supra note 89.
91 See Keith, supra note 18; Customers' Affordable Reliable Energy (CARE)
provided by ComEd, About Us, http://www.exeloncorp.com/comedcare
_main/comedcare/aboutus.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2007).
92 Colindres, supra note 60.
93 Keith, supra note 18, at 3.
94 Exelon Corp., Annual Report (Form 10K), at 146 (Mar. 21, 2003) and Ex-
elon Corp., Annual Report (Form 10K), at 268 (Feb. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Exelon
Report 2005 ].
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ComEd estimated a A oodwill impairment of $1.2 billion and $776
million respectively. In 2005, the impairment of goodwill was
driven by the upcoming end of the transition period, the end of the re-
lated transition revenues as well as by regulatory uncertainty in Illi-
nois that existed as of the time of the impairment analysis on Novem-
ber 1, 2005.96 The impairment of goodwill caused CoinEd to record
a net loss of $685 million in 2005.97 Utility companies are concerned
that if they are not allowed to recover their costs by charging at least
the amount paid for the energy they deliver, they will suffer a down-
grade in their credit rating and lose opportunities to enter or remain in
certain financial markets. 98 However, subsequent to the impairment
analysis, the ICC approved the procurement method proposed by
CoinEd and the regulatory uncertainty that existed at the end of 2005
has since disappeared. In 2006, the impairment of goodwill was
driven by further regulatory uncertainties that occurred at the time of
the 2006 impairment analysis, November 1, 2006. 99 The regulatory
uncertainties that existed at the time included, among others, the un-
certainty related to annual power auctions, the potential for an exten-
sion of the rate freeze or a legislatively imposed phase-in that may
not include interest charges on deferred payments." ° The $776 im-
pairment of goodwill resulted in a net loss of $112 million in 2006.101
While ComEd is no doubt being conservative in its estimates of
goodwill impairment due to the uncertainty of events leading up to
the end of the transition period, the fact remains that none of the
events ComEd thought may affect income and profits have occurred
almost a quarter of the way through 2007. Furthermore, ComEd's
recent negative profits have done little to slow the growth of the stock
price of Exelon, ComEd's parent company. During the ten-year rate
freeze, Exelon's stock price has risen from approximately $10 a share
in 1997 to over $60 a share in late 2006 and into 2007.102
95 Exelon Corp., Annual Report (Form 10K), at 225-26 (Feb. 13, 2007) [here-
inafter Exelon Report 2006].
96 Id.
97 Exelon Report 2005, supra note 94, at 268.
98 Id. at 10.
99 Exelon Report 2006, supra note 95, at 225.
'
0 0 Id. at 212-13.
'°lId. at 167.
102 Exelon Corp.- stock information, http://www.exeloncorp.com (follow In-
vestor Relations hyperlink; then follow stock information hyperlink) (last visited
Mar. 5, 2007).
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Ameren has experienced similar financial success during the
ten-year rate freeze. During the past ten years, Ameren's stock has
increased from approximately $35 a share in 1997 to about $50 a
share in 2007.103 In 2002, Ameren recorded a net profit of $382 mil-
lion, in 2003 a net profit of $524 million, in 2004 a net profit of $530
million, in 2005 a net profit of $606 million, and in 2006 a net profit
of $547 million.' 0 4 Over the most recent 5-year period, the com-
pany's net profits have increased virtually every year, and profits
have risen approximately 44 percent since 2002.
The financial data of the two Illinois utilities indicate that
these companies have grown their profits despite having electricity
rates frozen for nearly ten years. They have done so by requesting
increased distribution charges from the ICC. The utilities only earn
profits from the delivery charge portion of electricity bills.10  The
electricity that utilities purchase from generators is sold to customers
with zero mark-up. 0 6 Therefore, the utilities will only earn a profit
on the portion of the 22-55 percent increase in energy costs repre-
sented by an ICC approved increase in delivery charge. With profits
increasing nearly every year, the utilities have clearly established a
way not only to stay profitable, but to increase profitability despite
only earning profits from the 20-30 percent of each electricity bill
representing delivery charges. In order to ensure that the utility com-
panies recover their costs, it seems reasonable for the utilities to re-
quest interest charges on deferred amounts relating to the cost of en-
ergy generation. However, the fact that the phase-in plans currently
in effect include a 3.25 percent interest charge on all deferred
amounts, including the delivery charge, results in the utilities earning
interest on their profits in order to retain and grow their earnings. To
expect interest on profits seems to be an unreasonable request.
VI. Effect of Increased Electric Bills on Consumers in
2007 and Subsequent Years
With electricity rates rising an average of 22 percent for Co-
mEd customers and 55 percent for Ameren customers beginning on
103 Ameren - Stock Chart, http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c
=91845&p=irol-stockchart (last visited Mar. 5, 2007).
104 Ameren, Annual Report (Form 10K), at 86 (Mar. 9, 2004) and Ameren,
Annual Report (Form 10K), at 80 (Mar. 1, 2007).
05 Manor, supra note 5; Smith, supra note 58.
106 Manor, supra note 5.
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107January 2, 2007 , many Illinois residents and businesses find them-
selves faced with difficult decisions this winter and in the upcoming
summer. The Illinois AARP anticipates the rate hikes to be felt the
hardest by seniors and young families; those with low or fixed in-
comes. 10 8 The increasing costs will affect all aspects of society from
the government to small and large businesses.
AARP lobbyist Mary Patton predicts that the increase in elec-
tricity costs will ultimately result in additional taxes to help govern-
ments pay for the increased overhead, and businesses will become
even more concerned with their bottom line and cutting costs.' °9 All
of this is bad news for the seniors and others living on a fixed in-
come. A modest electric bill of $100 monthly will increase to be-
tween $122 monthly and $155 monthly causing a yearly increase in
costs from between $264 to $660. Such an increase could have a pro-
found effect on an individual living on a fixed budget. Many indi-
viduals on fixed or low income budgets may be faced with difficult
decisions regarding whether to heat or cool their home or to purchase
other necessary items such as medicine and health care.
While the Ameren and ComEd phase-in plans will help indi-
viduals with fixed incomes to pay their bills in the short-run, these
individuals will be paying the price in later years with interest
charges. Charges from the first year of the phase-in that are deferred
until the third year will be compounded at an annual interest rate of
3.25 percent. Each year the fixed income individuals will owe the
utility companies more money while their income remains constant.
While they will be better able to pay their bills in the short-run, what
will happen to these individuals after year three when they are unable
to pay the balance with three years of accrued interest? The Illinois
General Assembly has known for years that the electricity rate freeze
would end on January 1, 2007 and that date has come and gone with-
out any action from the legislature. During his re-election campaign,
Illinois Governor Blagojevich adamantly advocated for an extension
of the rate freeze, but no legislation can reach him until the Illinois
House of Representatives and the Senate can agree on the best way to
assist Illinois customers.
10
107 Chase & Garcia, supra note 62.
108 The Real Deal on Electricity in Illinois: What does a pending electrical rate
hike mean for Illinois seniors?, AARP, http://www.aarp.org/states/il/il-
news/thereal deal on electricityinillinois.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2007).
109 Keith, supra note 18, at 1.
110 See Chase & Pearson, supra note 39.
[Vol. 19:3
Deregulation of the Energy Industry in Illinois
VII. Alternative Possibilities to Reduce Costs to
Consumers
An alternative way in which energy consumers can control
the amount of their energy bill is through a new technology known as
demand response. The idea behind demand response is to shift or cut
the load from utilities via time of use rates or critical peak pricing
plans.' However, such technology requires advanced metering and,
as of yet, demand response has only penetrated approximately 6 per-
cent of the market. 112 The concept flows from basic economic prin-
cipals of supply and demand. During peak times of energy use, cus-
tomers are either requested to use energy at different times of the day
or are provided with incentives to do so because they will be charged
lower rates, for example3 late at night than they would be charged for
peak electricity times. As the demand decreases during peak
times, lower prices can result for all electricity consumers.
However, there are several disadvantages to demand response
- the main disadvantage being the capital cost of the equipment re-
quired in order to implement demand response. 114 The savings that
could result directly from demand response seems to be worth the ini-
tial capital expenditure. Just last summer, demand response was
credited with saving approximately $600 million over a week long
heat wave along the east coast." During peak times, rather than
having to use additional energy, customers chose to use less electric-
ity, which resulted in huge daily savings."l 6 On August 2, 2006
alone, demand response was credited with savings of $230 million. 7
Customers who voluntarily reduced their energy demand during peak
times also received as incentives, cash rebates equal to the market
value of the electricity saved."i8 While demand response is not yet a
major player in the large U.S. markets, it seems to be a cost saving
solution which gives consumers a choice as to when they want to use
111 Report Says Demand Response Still a Small Player, But EEl Sees 'Buzz' In
Recent Weeks, ELECTRIC UTIL., Aug. 14, 2006, at 1.
112 Id. at 1-2.
1131id.
114 Id. at 5.
'15 Demand Response Saved $650 Million During Heat Wave, ENERGY DAILY,
Aug. 18, 2006.
116 id.
117 id.
118 Id.
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electricity and when they want to save money.
VIII. Conclusion
With the situation in the Illinois General Assembly still in a
deadlock, individuals with fixed or low incomes must demand a re-
sult. If the legislature extends the rate freeze for another few years,
they cannot repeat the mistake they made this time around by allow-
ing the rate freeze to expire without having an alternative plan in
place. Currently, the element of society that is most in need of gov-
ernment protection, low and fixed income individuals, has been left
abandoned by the Illinois General Assembly. If the Illinois General
Assembly decides to freeze rates for a few more years, they should
seriously consider demand response technology to allow customers to
control how much energy they use and at what times. This technol-
ogy can result in either huge savings or additional expenditures de-
pending solely on the decisions made by the customer. On the other
hand, if the legislature opts to adopt a phase-in procedure, they
should do so without charging interest on deferred payments. At the
very least, the legislature should push for a phase-in plan that does
not charge the 3.25 percent interest on any deferred delivery rate
charges.
Regardless of the actions taken by the legislature, the fact re-
mains that the price increases do not appear to be indicative of com-
petitive prices, as competitive prices would have more likely lowered
the cost of electricity rather than increased it. With other industries,
such as the communication industry, deregulation has resulted in
lower prices as countless new telecommunication companies have
emerged. Approximately ten years after deregulation, long-distance
telephone rates decreased by 50 percent.1 9 The same cannot be said,
as of yet, for the utility industry. The energy market has not pro-
duced any decline in market prices ten years after deregulation be-
gan.'2 0 The idea behind deregulation is that customers will benefit
from lower prices in a given industry. Currently in Illinois, the oppo-
site has occurred, and electricity prices have increased at shockingly
high rates. Until adequate competition emerges in the industry, utili-
ties are better suited to be regulated.
19 Johnston, supra note 1.
120 id.
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